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THE EMOTIONAL STATE AND LOCALIZED NORMS: A
REPLY
Clare Huntington
I am grateful to Professor Fineman for her probing and engaged response to
my Article.1 I will take this opportunity to make explicit some of the implicit
assumptions of the Article that Professor Fineman identifies as worthy of
elaboration.
I. DEFINING THE STATE
A. Embracing Fragmentation
Professor Fineman contends that I portray the state as "rather monolithic
and omnipotent. ''2 She argues that the state is fragmented in many respects,
with multiple levels of government regulating the family, different entities
within even a single level of government (legislative, judicial, executive, and
administrative), and varied forces, both legal and extralegal, acting in tension
with one another. Additionally, she contends, instead of regarding the state as
a disembodied entity, we should work to identify the individuals who
constitute the state, each with their own ambitions, ideologies, biases, and
personalities. Professor Fineman questions whether the reality of this
fragmentation "undermines the idea that the state can be conceptualized as
acting to accomplish a singular goal or objective." 3
I agree with her vision of the state. An implicit assumption throughout my
Article is that it is the very absence of a monolithic state that drives resort to
emotion. Indeed, the fragmentation that she describes is what interests me. If
the state were a unified entity capable of making decisions without friction,
there would be little need for the kind of indirect regulation I describe. A
monolithic state could act rationally using a single set of variables, and state
regulation would be relatively straightforward. The state would not need to
change the emotional context of who can marry, exercise reproductive choice,
1 Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103 (2010).
2 Id. at 1171 (reponse piece by Martha Albertson Fineman).
' Id. at 1174 n.6.
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and so on; the state would simply make calculations and implement decisions
in a linear fashion.
Instead, the state is messy. It is messy both structurally and internally, in
precisely the ways that Professor Fineman describes. And it is messy
emotionally, with individuals acting on, and out of, emotion. Once we
understand the state in this way, we can appreciate why indirect regulation
often replaces direct regulation. The proxy battles described in my Article are
the result of individuals governing in a federal context, within political
constraints, and against a backdrop of deep emotions. The state cannot and
does not make rational choices and implement them in a linear and transparent
fashion, so it resorts to second-best alternatives. Individuals cannot ban
abortion, so they enact indirect laws that can garner sufficient political support
(such as the infant safe haven laws described in the Article) and still influence
the calculus of whether to abort a fetus.
Once we recognize the state as this kind of actor, the choices for state
regulation are more constrained. If we had a monolithic state, then state
regulation through the emotional valence of social norms might well recede in
importance. For these reasons, Professor Fineman's point is well taken and I
am glad to have the opportunity to clarify my understanding of "the state."
B. The Emotional State
In her second point about the state as an actor or agent, Professor Fineman
contends that how and why the state acts "complicate[s] the idea of a single-
purposive state action.",4 I agree. But in my Article, the filter is not the state
but rather the people affected by the state. It is less relevant to the focus of my
Article why any given set of individuals or institutions within government
chooses to act as they do. My focus is on how this action affects the people it
regulates.5
Although she does not frame it exactly this way, I understand Professor
Fineman's argument to be about the emotional motivations of state actors. As
she so rightly notes, this motivation can vary widely from institution to
institution and individual to individual, complicating any understanding of
4 Id.
5 To be sure, when I speak of state norm entrepreneurship, Professor Fineman's points are deeply
relevant. The discussion in Part JH.C of my Article addressing how the state harnesses social norms for certain
ends is a preliminary one. When I explore these issues more fully in future scholarship, I will address the
nuances Professor Fineman identifies as inherent in any state action.
[Vol. 59
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emotion within the state. Despite this uncertainty and complexity, or perhaps
because of it, it is intriguing to think about an emotional "state." Theories of
state action typically do not account for emotion. For example, the public
choice model entails a much colder calculation, positing that legislators acting
out of self-interest will be more responsive to the needs of interest groups at
6the expense of society as a whole. Public choice theory may recognize
motivations such as the desire for power, but it does not come close to
articulating a complete theory of the role that emotion plays in the decisions of
state actors. The relatively new field of law and emotion also has not
articulated a theory of the emotional state.7
Missing from the current legal discourse is an understanding that state
actors are individuals who draw upon their own emotions. As I elaborated in
the Article, 8 emotion is interwoven into human existence, informing our
judgments and experiences. Therefore, the apparatus of the seemingly neutral
state is really a collection of individuals who are the very embodiment of
emotion. This fascinating topic of emotions within the state is not, however,
the focus of my Article.
II. DEFINING SOCIAL NORMS
Professor Fineman identifies two kinds of norms-hard and soft-and
states that for analytic purposes she prefers to refer only to hard norms.
Drawing upon the work of Richard Morris, she argues that hard norms are
"more universal, specific, heavily sanctioned, or absolute." 9  Professor
Fineman argues that I use the term social norms to mean both these hard norms
and soft norms-where sanctions are sporadic, enforcement is limited, and
applicability is more narrow. She understands these as constraints or
expectations, not social norms. She contends that using soft norms means my
analysis is less cogent because I cannot theorize about the relationship between
norm and sanction-that is, I cannot say anything about the predictive power
of norms.
6 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
14-15 (1991).
7 One scholar, Terry Maroney, has begun a project of exploring the role of emotion in the judiciary. See
Terry A. Maroney, The Myth of the Dispassionate Judge (manuscript on file with author). However, to my
knowledge, there has not been a similar exploration of the role of emotion in either the executive or legislative
branches.
8 Huntington, supra note 1, at 1104.
9 Id. at 1179 (reponse piece by Martha Albertson Fineman).
2010]
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Although I agree that there is a distinction between norms and expectations,
I disagree that much of what I describe in my Article falls into the category of
"soft" norms. The Article defines social norms only briefly, but my definition
largely follows the one set forth by Professor Richard McAdams, who explains
that norms (1) differ from legal rules in that they are enforced through non-
legal sanctions; (2) are obligations that individuals feel compelled to follow, as
distinguished from a "tendency of behavior"; and (3) can flow in both formal
and informal contexts. 10
Addressing each element of Professor Fineman's definition of a norm-
universal, specific, heavily sanctioned, and absolute-I question whether these
requirements are really necessary for a social norm to exist. Beginning with
universality, familial social norms can be highly localized and contextual, but
this lack of universality does not render them any less powerful. Of course, in
a country as vast and complex as the United States, norms will differ from one
community to the next, but the absence of ubiquity does not diminish the
norm's power within the relevant context. Returning to the examples I
highlight in my Article, the reality that a breastfeeding imperative in Park
Slope may not be present in the South Bronx does not render the imperative
any less salient in Park Slope. And in light of the local nature of family life,
the immediate community is often what is most relevant to the family. A
woman is far more likely to be breastfeeding (or bottle feeding, to the glares of
other mothers) in a local coffee shop or park in Park Slope than she is to be
doing so across town. We live locally and we experience most of our familial
norms locally. Of course we also are a highly mobile society, especially
upper-income families; thus families often choose their community, in effect
opting into a set of social norms. But this does not mean that once in that
community, those norms are any less dominant. This plurality of norms is a
challenge for regulation, but it does not mean that the norms are less salient
because they are diverse across contexts.
Turning to specificity, even abstract norms can have a strong pull.
Professor McAdams explains that norms can be effective and obligate
compliance:
if those norms give substantive meaning to abstract, internalized
obligations. One social role many in our society internalize is that of
"parent"; many feel guilt if they believe they fail to be a "good"
10 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,
350-51 (1997).
[Vol. 59
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mother or father. Like most abstract norms, the vagueness of these
obligations makes them easily internalized but provides little concrete
behavioral guidance. Yet concrete esteem norms give many
meanings to this obligation: in some communities, the consensus
dictates that a "good parent' reads to his or her children, teaches
them table manners, takes them to church, and provides them with a
"safe environment."
If this account is correct, then the expressive function of law can
work to define further the roles that are enforced by guilt. A law
obligating the use of child safety devices expresses a new consensus
that the absence of such devices exposes a child to unacceptably high
risks contrary to minimally acceptable parental behavior. The
vagueness of the internalized obligation generally allows parents
great flexibility to rationalize their behavior as consistent with their
obligations. But when society announces its belief that a concrete
behavior is required of parents, rationalization becomes more
difficult. If one accepts that being a good parent requires something,
then it is difficult to resist the (apparently) informed judgment of
others about what child safety requires, at least when one is not
independently knowledgeable of the precise risks involved. Thus, the
law expresses a consensus and creates an esteem-based norm
defining good parental behavior. For some parents, complying with
the law is then necessary to avoid guilt. Even absent external,
informal enforcement, the law can elicit internal enforcement.
11
I explored precisely this dynamic in my Article, and this is where I see the
entry point for the law. Again, the abstractness of a norm does not make it
inherently less salient; it simply means that other processes are necessary to
give the norm content.
I similarly disagree with Professor Fineman's contention that norms must
be heavily sanctioned. To be sure, some sanction must exist for the norm to be
operative, but it need not rise to the level Professor Fineman envisions, such as
the excommunication from a cherished faith community.12  Sensitivity to
sanctions will vary among individuals, with one person devastated by a
judgmental look and another oblivious, but so long as a sanction is felt by most
people, the norm will be relevant to familial behavior. As I note in the Article,
11 Id. at 407-08.
12 Huntington, supra note 1, at 1179 n.24 (response piece by Martha Albertson Fineman).
2010] A REPLY 1187
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the sanction need not be external. To the extent a person has internalized a
particular norm, she will feel guilty for not complying. Guilt is the sanction.
13
Finally, the requirement that a norm be absolute appears to be a reiteration
of the earlier requirements. As Professor Fineman notes, Richard Morris
defines an absolute norm as one "which is known and supported by everyone,
which applies to everybody under all conditions, which is rigorously enforced
by heavy sanctions.14 These requirements do not constitute the irreducible
minimum of a social norm, although I fully acknowledge that these criteria
form one end of the relevant continuum.
Professor Fineman further argues that only hard norms will yield
predictable behavior. I agree that the clearer the social norm, the easier it may
be to shape that norm toward a desired end. But my point about emotion is
that we cannot even begin to understand the predictive power of norms without
an appreciation of the role of emotion. Emotion can skew norm formation and
enforcement, but it does not render incoherent the calculus of input and output.
I agree that in my discussion of the state I rely on an implicit understanding of
the relationship between the structure of sanctions and the resulting social
norms. But to insist upon a dichotomy of hard and soft norms ignores the
reality that the relationship between sanctions and norms is complicated by
emotions. There is a relationship, but it is simply never going to be a linear,
rational calculation. There may be less emotional overlay and interplay in
other contexts, but when talking about whom to marry, whether to have
children, and how to parent, it is not possible to ignore the role of emotion in
these intimate choices. To do so would yield a formula that does not make
sense.
III. DEFINING EMOTION
Professor Fineman contends that my understanding of emotion is overly
inclusive and that I fail to define emotion. Her point is well taken and, to
13 Returning to the subject of breastfeeding, the writer Ayelet Waldman describes an experience she had
bottle feeding her infant while standing in a Berkeley bakery. A stranger turned to her, saying "you know,
breast is best." AYELET WALDMAN, BAD MOTHER: A CHRONICLE OF MATERNAL CRIMES, MINOR CALAMITIES,
AND OCCASIONAL MOMENTS OF GRACE 58 (2009). Rather than simply telling the woman to mind her own
business, Waldman launched into a long explanation about how the milk in the bottle was expressed breast
milk and described all the ways she was trying to breastfeed her child, despite considerable challenges. Id.
Guilt, both external and internal, is the dominant emotion.
14 Fineman, supra note 21, at 1178 (quoting Richard T. Morris, A Typology of Norms, 21 AM. Soc. REV.
610, 612 (1956) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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clarify my understanding of emotion, I begin by noting that emotion
scholarship has yet to settle on a single definition of emotion, nor has it
reached a consensus on the role of cognition in emotion.15 Antonio Damasio, a
leading neuroscientist, has outlined a useful approach to these questions.
Professor Damasio contends that an emotion is a "patterned collection of
chemical and neural responses that is produced by the brain when it detects the
presence of an emotionally competent stimulus-an object or situation, for
example. The processing of the stimulus may be conscious but it need not be,
as the responses are engendered automatically., 16  He further argues that
"[m]ost emotional responses are directly observable either with the naked eye
or with scientific probes . . . . Thus, emotions are not subjective, private,
elusive or undefinable." 17  To draw upon the work of psychologist Robert
Emery, emotion is no longer understood as simply an internal state, but rather
as "a part of broader systems of motivation, behavior, and brain circuitry." 18
As Professor Emery explains, emotions "are the internal, motivating part of
several different brain-behavior systems, for example, responding to pain,
forming social attachments, grieving, and the fight or flight response." 19
Finally, Professor Fineman notes that in discussing emotion, I seem to
overplay its role, making it the content, catalyst, regulator, and complicater of
social norms. 2 My intention is not to elevate emotion to the exclusion of other
relevant factors, but rather to focus my inquiry on this underappreciated and
understudied factor.
I appreciate Professor Fineman's engagement with my work. It has been
helpful for my own thinking, to clarify some implicit assumptions, and to
15 See Laura E. Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 974, 983-84
(2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) and describing the debate among
emotion theorists about how to construct a taxonomy of emotions and how to distinguish emotions from
moods and desires); see id at 987-92 (describing a similar debate about the definition of cognition and how to
distinguish it from emotion).
16 Antonio Damasio, Fundamental Feelings, 413 NATURE 781, 781 (2001).
17 Id. By contrast, "[f]eelings are the mental representation of the physiological changes that characterize
emotions. Unlike emotions.., feelings are indeed private, although no more subjective than any other aspect
of the mind." Id.
i8 Robert E. Emery, Anger Is Not Anger: Different Motivations Behind Anger and Why They Matter for
Family Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 346, 346-47 (2009).
19 Id. at 347.
20 Huntington, supra note 1, at 1181 (response piece by Martha Albertson Fineman).
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elaborate on other points. As she notes, we share the ambition of imagining a
more responsive state, and I look forward to traveling that path together.
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